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784 HAY l:lAFLERS ETC. UNION [45 C.2d 
In Bank. Dec. 1955.] 
JOHN OOSTEN. v. HAY HAULERS DAIRY 
EMPI .. OYEES AND HELPERS UNION, etc., et al., 
Defendants: KNUDSEN CREAMERY COMPANY OF 
Contracts-Perfonnance--Impossibility.-Impossibility of per-
formance of a contract is a defense, and the burden of estab-
lishing it rests on defendant. 
[2] Id.-Perfonnance-Impossibility.-"Impossibility," as excuse 
for nonperformance of a contract, is not only strict impossi-
bility but includes impracticability because of extreme and 
unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved. 
[3] Id.-Performance--Impossibility.-Temporary impossibility of 
the character which, if it should become permanent, would 
discharge a promisor's entire contractual duty operates as a 
pennanent discharge if performance after the impossibility 
ceases would impose a substantially greater burden on the 
promisor; otherwise the duty is suspended while the impossi-
bility exists. 
[4] Id.-Performance--Impossibility.-No contractor is excused 
from performance under an express provision in the contract 
dispensing with performance when "causes are beyond the 
control" of the contractor unless he shows affirmatively that 
his failure to perform was proximately caused by a contin-
gency within its terms: that in spite of skill, diligence and 
good faith on his part, performance became impossible or 
unreasonably 
[5] Id.-Performance-Impossibility.-In an action by a milk 
producer against a creamery for breach of a milk purchase 
agreement providing that no liability should arise if 
labor trouble which ·'directly or indirectly" involved either 
party rendered performance impossible, the trial court was 
justified in concluding that the creamery was not prevented by 
impossibility from perfonning the contract because of instruc-
tions by a union, with which the creamery had a collective 
bargaining agreement, that its members were not to handle the 
producer's milk because it had been labeled "unfair" or "hot" 
by another union, where there was no evidence that the union 
first mentioned would call a strike if the milk was received 
by the creamery, where the creamery had not told its em-
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 238 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 380. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Contracts, §234; [6] Trial, §27; 
17] Sales, § 43; r8J Sales. § 384; [9] Sales, § 379. 
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would be if they refused to 
milk, and where the union in its collec-
tive that there would be no strike 
during the agrPement. 
f6] Trial-Remarks of Judge.-In an action by a milk producer 
a creamery for breach of a milk purchase agreement 
that no liability should arise if labor troublt• 
nn•nn·e~., or indirectly" involved either party rendered 
there was not prejudging by the 
trial court of the creamery's employees who testified that they 
would not have handled the milk because of instructions of 
the union with which the creamery had a collective bargaining 
agreem2nt, where the judge merely remarked that it would take 
an employee of courage to testify otherwise in the presence 
of agents of the union and that "as far as the weight of the 
evidence goes I think it is not as strong as it might be." 
[7] Sales-Breach of Contract-Cause.-Where defendant cream-
ery breached its agreement to purchase milk from plaintiff, 
but plaintiffs, in spite of a labor dispute with a union, de-
livered the milk and endeavored to have defendant accept it, 
the damages were caused by defendant's refusal to accept the 
milk rather than plaintiff's labor dispute. 
[8] Id.- Damages for Nonacceptance- Mitigation.-Where de-
fendant creamery breached its agreement to purchase milk 
from plaintiff, whose herd of cows inevitably produced milk 
daily, he should not be required to get rid of his herd to stop 
production; hence Civ. Code, § 1784, sub d. ( 4), relating to 
mitigation, can have no application in estimating the damages 
for the breach. 
[9] !d.-Damages for Nonacceptance-Measure.-In an action by 
a milk producer against a creamery for breach of a milk pur-
chase agreement, the difference between the price another 
creamery company paid for the milk and that specified in the 
contract was a proper measure of damages for the breach, 
where that company, in view of plaintiff's dispute with a union, 
was the only one which would accept plaintiff's milk, but which, 
in view of the fact that it had no market for Class I milk, 
paid plaintiff at the rate for a lower class of milk, and where 
defendant creamery had no legal excuse for its refusal to ac-
cept the milk. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frederick F. Houser, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by a milk producer against labor unions and a 
creamery for injunctive relief, damages and for breach of 
(:ontract. Judgment against defendant creamery for breach 
of contract, affirmed. 
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CAR'l'ER, J.-Plaintiff, a farmer, producer and seller 
of milk, recovered damages in the sum of $20,314.19 against 
defendant, Knudsen Creamery Company (hereinafter referred 
to as defendant), engaged in the business of processing and 
selling milk, for breach of contract, in an action against de-
fendant and several unions and their officers. Judgment was 
for the unions denying plaintiff damages or an injunction 
against them. Defendant appeals; plaintiff has not appealed. 
Plaintiff entered into a contract to supply milk to defend-
ant Knudsen Creamery Company, and this contract was in 
effect between August 6, 1951, and March 15, 1952. Under 
this contract defendant agreed to purchase milk produced by 
plaintiff during this period. Clause 12 of the contract pro-
vided: "In case of strike, lockout, or other labor trouble 
(whether the parties hereto are directly or indirectly involved) 
... which shall render it impossible for Seller to deliver, or 
buyer to handle or dispose of such milk, no liability for non-
compliance with this agreement caused thereby during the 
time of continuance thereof shall exist or arise with respect to 
either party hereto." (Emphasis added.) 
According to the findings of the trial court, between August 
6, 1951, and March 15, 1952, defendants Hay Haulers, Dairy 
Employees and Helpers Union, Local Union Number 737, 
associated with A. F. of L., and Plant and Clerical Dairy 
Employees, Local 93, were labor unions, and that Dairy Em-
ployees Union Local 17, associated with the Christian Labor 
Association, not a party, was also a union; that some time 
prior to August 6, 1951, defendant unions were having a labor 
dispute with plaintiff and declared a boycott against and 
picketed plaintiff's place of business; that the picketing ac-
tivity was stopped by a restraining order issued by the court; 
that defendant breached the contract in refusing to take plain-
tiff's milk from August 6, 1951, to March 15, 1952, when plain-
tiff sold his dairy herd; and that as a result, plaintiff suffered 
refusing to accept the milk was a claimed impossibility of per-
the damage above mentioned. Defendant's only reason for 
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formance under clause 12 of the contract, S1tpra. 'l'he court 
found that defendant did not ''prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it was impossible for it to handle or dispose'' 
of plaintiff's milk within the meaning and "proper interpreta-
tion'' of clause 12. 
Defendant contends that the evidence all shows that it was 
excused from the milk under clause 12 because of 
the refusal of its employees to handle it due to the labor dis-
pute between and Local 737; that plaintiff's failure to 
dispose of his milk at the prevailing market prices was caused 
by his dispute with the unions rather than a breach by defend-
ant of the contract. 
The evidence shows that in July, 1951, plaintiff had nine 
employees. He was then asked by the defendant unions to 
sign a collective bargaining agreement by which they would 
represent his employees. He refused to sign, asserting that 
his employees did not want to join the unions. He was advised 
the unions that unless he signed, his place of business would 
be picketed. On July 27, 1951, he signed a collective bargain-
ing agreement with Local 17 and in that connection the court 
found he took a leading part in inducing his employees to join 
that union. Picketing of plaintiff's place of business by de-
fendant unions was commenced on August 6, 1951. A defend-
ant union representative told defendant's employees, but not 
defendant, that a dispute rxisted with plaintiff and they did 
not have to handle plaintiff's mille Plaintiff hauled his milk 
to defendant's receiving point. Nygaard, defendant's fore-
man of unloading operations. refused to take the milk and 
called two of defendant's supervisory employees, and the fore-
man's request of the unloading employee, Lorge, that he un-
load the milk was refused on the grounds that it was "unfair'' 
milk, because of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant 
unions.* Plaintiff disposed of his milk elsewhere. Plaintiff 
commenced the instant action, and having obtained a restrain-
ing order against defendant unions, the picketing stopped. 
Several other attempts were made by plaintiff to deliver milk 
to defendant including the following: In September, 1951. 
he attempted to deliver his milk to defendant the same as 
before. Defendant's supervisory employees were present and 
the employee in charge of the unloading operation was given 
a copy of tre restraining order but said he would not handle 
the milk and defendant's foreman said they could do nothing 
*The unloading was done by defendant's employee pumping it from 
plaintiff's truck and could be done by one man. 
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about it. About two weeks later a similar under simi-
lar circumstances was made with similar results, with the 
addition that a new restraining order had been obtained 
which ordered defendant's employees to handle plaintiff's 
milk. Plaintiff testified that none of defendant's supervisory 
employees who were present, except foreman Nygaard, ordered 
Lorge or anyone else to unload the milk when plaintiff at-
tempted to make the various deliveries; however, there is 
evidence that one of such supervisory employees gave such 
order. After Lorge had refused to unload the milk, defendant's 
supervisory employees said there was nothing they could do 
about it. On August 28, 1951, plaintiff wrote to defendant 
regarding its refusal to accept the milk, stating that he had 
obtained an injunction against the picketing and demanded 
that defendant comply with the contract. 
There is evidence that r_~oeal 93 with whom defendant had 
a collective bargaining agreement covering its employees ad-
vised defendant that plaintiff's milk was "hot" and the em-
ployees under the bargaining agreement did not have to handle 
it and could not be fired for refusing to do so ; that the restrain-
ing order obtained by plaintiff did not change the situation; 
that an exempt employee of defendant, a supervisory em-
ployee, could not unload the milk. In a similar ease a year 
before, I_~ocal 93 had informed defendant that if any of its 
employees were fired or discharged for refusing to handle 
"hot" milk, the plant would be shut down. Defendant called 
a large number of its employees as witnesses, and they testified 
that they would have refused and would still refuse to handle 
plaintiff's milk under the circumstances, and it was stipulated 
that the rest of its employees would testify to the same effect. 
[1] Impossibility of performance is a defense and the 
burden of proof in establishing it rests on defendant. (Hens-
ler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Oal.App.2d 71, 83 [268 P.2d 
12] ; Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Sparling, 93 Oal.App.2d 768 
[209 P.2d 968]; McCulloch v. Liguori, 88 Oal.App.2d 366 [199 
P.2d 25]; Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Oal.2d 48 [153 P.2d 47].) 
[2] '' 'Impossibility' is defined in section 454 of the Restate-
ment of Contracts, as not only strict impossibility but as im-
practicability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, 
expense, injury, or loss involved. [3] Temporary impossibil-
ity of the character which, if it should become permanent, 
would discharge a promisor's entire contractual duty, operates 
as a permanent discharge if performance after the impossibility 
ceases would impose a substantially greater burden upon the 
promisor; otherwise the duty is suspended while the impossi-
Dee.1955] OOSTEN v. HAY HAULERS ETC. UNION 
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bility exists. (Restatement of Contracts, § 462.)" (Autry v. 
Repnblic Productions, Inc., 30 Cal.2d 144, 148 [180 P.2d 888] ; 
Lloyd v. Jtlnrphy, S1tpra, 25 Cal.2d 48.) In the instant 
ease we construe clause 12, with respect to impossibility of 
performance, the same as it is construed generally in contract 
law with regard to whether the performance has been made 
impossible. The only things the clause adds are that certain 
things-labor dispute, strikes-may excuse performance, when 
without it they might not, but the question remains whether 
those things have made performance impossible. [4] As has 
been said: "We can not always be sure what 'causes are 
beyond the control' of the contractor. Many fires can be pre-
vented by the use of foresight and sufficient expenditure. 
Most strikes can be avoided by a judicious yielding or by an 
abject surrender to demands. No contractor is excused under 
such an express provision unless he shows affirmatively that 
his failure to perform was proximately caused by a contingency 
within its terms; that, in spite of skill, diligence and good faith 
on his part, performance became impossible or unreasonably 
expensive." (Corbin on Contracts, § 1342.) 
[5] On the record before us the trial court was justified 
in concluding, as it did, that defendant was not prevented by 
impossibility from performing the contract. There was no 
evidence that the union would call a strike if the milk was 
received by defendant, except the inference that might be 
drawn from its claim in a similar situation a year before that 
it would shut down defendant's plant if defendant handled 
hot milk. The trial court was not compelled to draw that in-
ference. The court could have given little weight to the effect 
on defendant's employees of the statement by the officials and 
attorney of Local 93 that they, as individuals, were not re-
quired to handle hot milk or that the telling of defendant that 
they would not consider it a breach of the collective bargaining 
agreement between defendant and f_;ocal 93 for the employees 
to refuse to handle the milk. Defendant at no time told its 
employees that if they refused to handle plaintiff's milk they 
would be discharged. In the bargaining agreement between 
defendant and Local 93 the latter agreed that there shall be 
no strike during the life of the agreement and if any contro-
versy arose it would be settled by the negotiation procedure in 
the agreement, and ultimately by arbitration, if the other 
means failed. The court could infer that Local 93 would abide 
by the agreement. No steps were taken to settle any contro-
versy under the agreement. The weight of the testimony of 
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defendant's employees that they would not have handled 
plaintiff's milk was for the trial court. of them knew 
little about the dispute as to plaintiff's milk or what defendan1 
had been doing about hot milk or the attitude of Local 93. At 
most their testimony was as to what they would do, a matter 
only of their mental attitude, and whether would 
refuse when confronted with the discipline was 
another matter. in its 
that defendant had not proven impossibility; indeed, it may 
have concluded that defendant showed nothing more than a 
vague threat of adverse action by Local 93 and the employees 
(see Moore v. Whitty, 299 Pa. 58 [149 A. 93, 94] ), and that 
defendant was under no pressure other than its desire not to 
antagonize Local 93. 
Plaintiff's counsel remarked in his opening statement that 
defendant's plant would "probably be tied up" if it took 
plaintiff's milk but we do not consider that as conclusive. The 
trial court could still determine the case on the evidence. 
There is evidence that defendant's employees would obey the 
officials of Local 93, but as we have seen, it does not appear that 
Local 93 would necessarily have called a strike. The collective 
bargaining agreement between defendant and Local 93 pro-
vided that defendant could not ''discriminate against'' its 
employee members of Local 93 for "upholding the principles 
of the American Federation of Labor'' (emphasis added) but 
there still was the arbitration provision and the court was not 
required to find that those ''principles'' included a boycott. 
Nor is the situation different because the court approved the 
action of defendant's employees in refusing to handle the milk 
by denying an injunction or the loss that might have been suf-
fered by defendant if its plant was shut down because, as seen, 
defendant did not establish to the satisfaction of the trial court 
that such loss was imminent. 
[6] Contrary to defendant's contention we do not find any 
prejudging by the trial court of defendant's many employees 
\\·ho testified that they would not have handled the milk. He 
merely remarked that it would take an employee of courage 
to testify otherwise in the presence of agents of Local 93 and 
that "as far as the weight of the evidence goes I think it is 
not as strong as it might be.'' 
It is not decisive whether a strike or a refusal of Local 93 
1. o instruct its members to handle the milk or a refusal by 
defendant's employees to unload the milk would be legal or 
dlegal action for, as seen, the matter here turns on whether 
defendant has sustained its burden of showing impossibility, 
Dec. OosTEN v. HAY HAULERs ETC. UNION 
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the existence of which would excuse it from performance where 
eaused by a strike or labor trouble. 
Complaint is made that the damages were caused, not by 
defendant's refusal to take the milk but rather by the fact 
that the milk was "hot" because of plaintiff's dispute with 
Local 737 which prevented him from selling it elsewhere at the 
cnrrent market ; that plaintiff brought on the labor dis-
pute with Local 737 by signing with Local 17 and discharging 
an A. F. of L. employee working for him; that the evidence 
shows there was a market price established under state law 
for Class I milk, the kind plaintiff produced, and the contract 
between them provided for such market price. 
If that argument means that the cause of the contract breach 
by defendant was the labor dispute in which plaintiff was in-
volved it is nothing more than another argument on the 
issue of impossibility heretofore discussed. [7] Defendant 
breached the contract, but plaintiff, in spite of the labor dis-
pute with Local 737, delivered the milk and endeavored to 
have defendant accept it. Thus the damages, whatever they 
may be, were caused by defendant's refusal to accept the 
milk rather than plaintiff's labor dispute. Defendant's breach 
not being excused, as found by the trial court, it follows that 
plaintiff is entitled to any damages he suffered by reason of 
defendant's refusal to buy the mille The question then arises 
as to the proper measure of damages. Is the difference be-
tween the current market price of Class I milk and the price 
fixed in the contract the proper measure here? Section 1784 
provides: "(1) ·where the buyer wrongfully neglects or re-
fuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may maintain 
an action against him for damages for nonacceptance. 
"(2) ... The measure of damages is the estimated loss 
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of 
events, from the buyer's breach of contract. 
'' ( 3) Where there is an available market for the goods in 
question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special 
circumstances, showing proximate damage of a greater amount, 
the difference between the contract price and the market or 
current price at the time or times when the goods ought to 
have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, 
then at the time of the refusal to accept. 
" ( 4) (Mitigation.) If, while labor or expense of material 
amount are necessary on the part of the seller to enable him to 
fulfill his obligations under the contract to sell or the sale, 
the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or notifies the 
792 C.2d 
.~eller to proceed no further therewith, the 
to the seller for no greater damages than would have 
suffered if he did nothing towards carrying out the contract 
or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation or 
eountermand. The profit the seller would have made if the 
contract or the sale had been fully performed shall be con-
sidered in estimating such damages." (Emphasis added; Civ. 
Code, § 1784.) [8] Because plaintiff had his herd of cows 
and they inevitably produced milk daily, the milk was certain 
to be produced and he should not be required to get rid of his 
herd to stop production; therefore, subdivision 4 of section 
1784 can have no application. (See O'Hare v. Peacock 
Dairies, Inc., 26 Cal.App.2d 345 [79 P.2d 433].) 
[9] Defendant urges that subdivision 3 is applicable and 
as there were not special circumstances showing proximate 
damage of a greater amount, the difference between the con-
tract price and the market price is the measure; that the con-
tract price and current market price were the same and plain-
tiff's labor dispute, which made the milk hot rather than de-
fendant's refusal to accept it, was the proximate cause of any 
additional damages suffered by him; that hence plaintiff was 
entitled to no more than nominal damages. The court found 
that "the only creamery company within practicable delivery 
distance of plaintiff's dairy, which would accept plaintiff's 
milk during the period extending from August 6, 1951, to 
March 15, 1952, was the Excelsior Creamery Company ... 
that said ... Company, for the [said] period ... did accept 
all of plaintiff's milk ... but said Creamery Company was 
unable to use all of such milk as Class I milk by reason of 
pre-existing contracts with other milk producers, but, on the 
contrary could accept part of said plaintiffs' milk only as 
Class II or as manufacturing milk, respectively; the Court 
further finds that the prices paid milk producers by cream-
eries, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
Bureau of Milk Control of the State of California, for Class 
II milk and for manufacturing milk, respectively, is consider-
ably less in each case than that paid for Class I milk; the 
Court further finds that the difference between that which 
the plaintiff received for his milk, for the period extending 
from August 6, 1951, to March 15, 1952, from Excelsior 
Creamery Company and that which he would have received 
from the defendant . . . had said defendant carried out the 
terms of the above described contract ... by accepting all of 
plaintiff's milk ... as Cla1ss I milk, totals $20,314.19." The 
evidence shows plaintiff sold his milk to the Excelsior Cream-
Dec.1955] OosTEN v. HAY HAULERS ETC. UNION 793 
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ery Company at Santa Ana, 20 miles from his dairy (defend· 
ant's plant is in Los Angeles, 20 miles from plaintiff's dairy) 
bnt Excelsior had no market for Class I milk and paid plaintiff 
at the rate for a lower class of milk. Plaintiff testified that he 
tried to sell it elsewhere but could not because it was considered 
hot milk due to his dispute with Local 737. A witness for de-
fendant testified that during the period for which damages 
were awarded there was a market in the area for Class I milk. 
While it may be that one of the causes why plaintiff could not 
dispose of his milk, except to Excelsior, was the labor dispute. 
it still is true that he did not have any market for it except to 
Excelsior. There was no defect in the quality of the milk and 
defendant had no legal excuse for its refusal to accept the milk. 
The refusal of defendant and other union milk buyers to take 
plaintiff's milk resulted, at least in part, because they thought 
it might have some effect upon their collective bargaining 
agreements with the union. Thus a proximate result of de-
fendant's refusal to take the milk was plaintiff's inability to 
find a market. Under all the circumstances the court was 
justified in concluding that the only market available was 
Excelsior, the company to which plaintiff sold the milk, and 
the difference between the price they paid and that specified 
in the contract was a proper measure of damages. 
Amici curiae have filed a brief urging some of the points 
heretofore discussed and further asserting that the activity 
of the union defendants was a boycott, illegal under the Labor 
Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 158), and thus 
easily prevented by defendant by the machinery provided in 
that act, and that an illegal act by another will not support a 
finding of impossibility of performance. 'rhere is nothing in 
the ease to indicate that the national law is here applicable. 
Hence there is no occasion to discuss the merits of this con-
tention. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-Paragraph 12 of the contract which 
governs the rights of Oosten and the dairy provides: ''In 
case of strike, lockout, or other labor trouble (whether thP 
parties hereto are directly or indirectly involved) . . which 
shall render it impossible for Seller to deliver, or Buyer to 
handle or dispose of such milk, no liability for non-compliance 
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with this agreement caused thereby during the time of con-
tinuance thereof shall exist or arise with respect to either 
party thereto.'' In resisting the contention that Knudsen's 
performance was excused by this provision, the majority rely 
upon the finding that "the defendant ... did not prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it was 'impossible' for 
them to 'handle or dispose of' the milk of the plaintiff . . .. '' 
Although the burden of proving the facts upon which the 
defense of impossibility of performance rests lies with the 
one claiming under the defense (Hensler v. City of Los An-
geles, 124 Cal.App.2d 71, 83 [268 P.2d 12] ; Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc. v. Sparling, 93 Cal.App.2d 768, 775 [209 P.2d 
968] ) , whether the facts show the excuse of impossibility is a 
conclusion of law to be drawn by the court. (Mitchell v. 
Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal.2d 45, 48 [153 P.2d 53].) In 
the present case, there is no substantial dispute in the evi-
dence as to the circumstances and the conduct of the parties 
in relation to them. 
California follows a more liberal view than the courts of 
many other jurisdictions in the application of the doctrine 
of impossibility. It is not enough that performance of the 
contract is made more difficult or expensive (McCulloch v. 
Liguori, 88 Cal.App.2d 366, 372-373 [199 P.2d 25] and cases 
cited), but performance may be excused under circumstances 
showing "not only strict impossibility but . . . impractica-
bility because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, 
injury or loss involved." (Autry v. Republic Productions, 
Inc., 30 Cal.2d 144, 148 [180 P.2d 888]; City of Vernon v. 
City of Los Angeles, ante, p. 710 [290 P.2d 841] ; Mineral 
Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 293 [156 P. 458, 
L.R.A. 1916F 1]; Rest. Contracts, § 462.) 
It may be presumed that in adopting paragraph 12 of their 
contract, the parties had in mind the more liberal rule as 
to "impossibility" established by California law. Further-
more, the parties appear to have so qualified their use of 
the term by express contemplation of the possibility of ''strike, 
lockout, or other labor trouble (whether the parties hereto 
are directly or indirectly involved)," contingencies which 
ordinarily do not render performance impossible under strict 
definitions of the term. Such a provision, even under the 
strict view of impossibility followed by many courts, prob-
ably would suffice as a ''proper condition'' or ''qualification'' 
whereby a party might "shield" himself from impractica-
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bility of arising from labor difficulties. (Of. 
Kiyoichi Fujikawa v. Sunrise Soda Water Works, 158 F.2d 
490, 493.) 
Oosten was directly involved in a labor controversy with 
the union which also represented the workers of Knudsen. 
Because of that controversy his milk was branded as being 
"unfair." Unquestionably, the refusal of Knudsen's workers 
to handle the milk, was based upon the demands of the union 
representatives. The testimony of the Knudsen men who 
received and processed the milk establish that they refused 
to handle it even in face of threats of discharge. In these 
circumstances, performance of the contract would have been 
impractical and unreasonably difficult. 
The argument is made, however, that Knudsen should have 
taken further action in an effort to coerce its employees to 
handle Oosten's products. Knudsen might have discharged 
its employees who refused to handle the products and then 
attempted to pursue its legal remedies, if any, against the 
union, which, it is said, at most made only "a vague threat 
to call a strike" if the products were handled. (Of. Moore 
v. Whitty, 299 Pa. 58 [149 A. 93, 94].) But the evidence 
clearly shows that the employees vital to the processing of 
the milk refused to handle it despite a court order, the direct 
orders of the employer's representatives to handle the milk 
and the threat of discharge. To require the employer to dis-
charge its employees, with resulting losses in the handling of 
the products of other suppliers, would place upon the em-
ployer the burden of sustaining additional losses without any 
likelihood that it could fulfill its obligations under the Oosten 
contract. 
Furthermore, it is unrealistic under present day condi-
tions to construe a clause designed to insulate the parties 
to a contract from liability for nonperformance arising from 
''labor trouble'' as affording protection only to the party 
who ultimately establishes the justice of his position in the 
controversy. Commonly, particularly in matters involving 
economic pressure against persons not directly involved in 
the labor dispute, the parties are thrown into the controversy 
without any certainty of their ultimate legal rights. In such 
a case, there is even greater reason why such person should 
wish to shield himself from liability for nonperformance 
occasioned by a yielding to the pressure. 
For these reasons, in my opinion, reasonably construed, 
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paragraph 12 of the contract excuses performance of it under 
the circumstances established by the undisputed facts. 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
18, 1956. Schauer, and Spence, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 23118. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1955.) 
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[1] Vendor and Purchaser-Construction of Contract-Extrinsic 
Evidence.-Where a college agreed to buy a large tract of 
land, a portion of which was to be subdivided into lots and 
resold by the college and, as they were resold, the lots were 
to be released from the lien of a trust deed which was to be 
given to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase 
price on the original contract of sale, and where, with respect 
to such unpaid balance, the promissory notes executed by the 
college clearly provided that the principal and interest were 
to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of lots by the college, 
but it was not clear whether the "release price" payments, 
or payments of a fixed per cent of the receipts from sub-
division sales plus certain specified sums which the college 
agreed to pay to the sellers on a designated day each month, 
were to be applied solely on principal, extrinsic evidence was 
properly received to aid the court in interpreting the agree-
ment. 
[2] Id.- Construction of Contract- Interest.-Findings of the 
trial court, supported by evidence, that a provision of a con-
tract for sale of land to a college declaring that all payments 
should first be credited on interest was omitted from promis-
sory notes of the college by mutual agreement of attorneys 
for the parties in order to make certain that "release price" 
payments, or payments of a fixed per cent of the receipts from 
subdivision sales by the college plus certain specified sums, 
would be credited solely on principal, that the notes were ap-
proved by the collf'ge and its attorney before they were ex-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser,§ 99; [2, 6] 
Vendor and Purchaser. § 104; [3] Vendor and Purchaser, § 255; 
[ 4) Agency, § 194; [5] Attorneys, § 25. 
